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THE RATIONALE BEHIND THE DECISIONS
The rationale underlying these decisions is stark in itssimplicity: the Brussels-Lugano regime must beinterpreted so as to further its three overarching
aims, which I identified earlier, that is to say, it must be
interpreted so as
i. to promote legal certainty thereby enhancing legal
protection for those domiciled in the member states;
ii. to place proper weight on the doctrine of mutual trust
between member states and their internal legal systems;
and
iii. thereby to enhance the development of the EU internal
market.
Legal Certainty
The importance of legal certainty is emphasised
throughout the three decisions. The court’s rejection of a
power to derogate from Article 21 was rejected in Gasser on
two grounds.
The first was that there was no explicit power in the
Convention to derogate: see paragraph 71. The absence of
an explicit power of course does not necessarily mean that
a power could not be implied into the Convention.
Although the Court did not address the question of
implication, the second reason for rejecting the derogation
demonstrates why it would not have been able do so: such
a power would undermine the aim of ensuring the
achievement of legal certainty which the Convention
sought to ensure by creating a single, common
jurisdictional regime: see paragraph 51. It is interesting to
note that the importance of this aim was one which the
Court felt no need to expand on in great detail because its
status and importance were accepted as common ground
between the parties: see paragraph 72 and its importance
is implicitly acknowledged at paragraphs 44–45 of
Advocate-General Lèger’s opinion.
The role that legal certainty plays in guiding the Court’s
interpretation of the regime is also inherent in Advocate-
General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer’s opinion in Turner. He said
in paragraph 33:
“The Convention seeks to provide a comprehensive system, for
which reason it is appropriate to ask ourselves whether a
measure which has an impact on its field of application is
compatible with the common rules which it establishes. The
question must be answered in the negative.”
A comprehensive system is one which tends towards
certainty: it is of the widest application. Equally, and
obviously, the creation of common rules applicable to all,
in this case Convention member states, fosters certainty.
The ability of States to arrogate a power outwith that
common regime to decide questions of jurisdiction by, for
instance, issuing an anti-suit injunction would in the
Advocate-General’s words lead to “chaos.” It would be
wholly antipathetic to legal certainty because, although the
Advocate-General does not put it in these terms, it would
in effect permit individual States to reintroduce national
rules governing jurisdiction, something which the
Convention explicitly aims to remove.
The Advocate-General’s opinion on this issue was
approved by the ECJ in paragraphs 29 and 30 of its2
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judgment, where it clearly stresses that the regime’s
commitment to legal certainty must not be undermined by
member states deploying any procedural mechanism in
respect of litigation governed by the regime except those
sanctioned by the regime itself. The regime is all-
embracing.
Advocate-General Lèger’s opinion in Owusu offers the
most detailed exposition of the commitment to legal
certainty. That aim is identified at paragraphs 159–62 of
his opinion in these terms:
“(159) In the terms of its preamble, the Convention aims ‘to
strengthen in the Community the legal protection of persons
therein established’. Again according to the preamble, it is for
that purpose that the Convention lays down, first, rules
concerning the jurisdiction of courts common to the
Contracting States and, second, rules to facilitate recognition
of judgments and to establish an expeditious procedure for
their enforcement.
(160) The Court has clarified the meaning of that aim of the
Convention, in particular with regard to the common
jurisdictional rules which it contains. It has taken the view
that the strengthening of the legal protection of persons
established in the Community involves ‘enabling the claimant
to identify easily the court in which he may sue and the
defendant reasonably to foresee in which court he may be
sued’. The Court has also characterised those rules as
‘guaranteeing certainty as to the allocation of jurisdiction
among the various national courts before which proceedings in
matters relating to a contract may be brought’.
(161) Only jurisdictional rules meeting those requirements
are capable of guaranteeing observance of the principle of
legal certainty, which is also, according to settled case-law,
one of the objectives of the Brussels Convention.
(162) In my view, those two aims of the Convention, both
that of strengthening legal protection for people established in
the Community and that of ensuring legal certainty, mean
that the application of Article 2 of the Convention cannot be
made conditional on the existence of a dispute displaying
connections with different Contracting States.”
Those aims would be undermined by permitting an
interpretation of Article 2 of the Convention which could
give rise to litigation concerning the question of when it
applied and when it did not. Most significantly, perhaps,
the Advocate-General identified disputes as to intra-
community jurisdiction as particularly problematic and
such as would give rise to the greatest degree of legal
uncertainty if such litigation were permitted: see
paragraphs 164–68. To militate against such uncertainty he
concluded that:
“(168) . . . in more general terms it is important to bear in
mind that private international law is a discipline which it is
far from easy to handle. The Brussels Convention is a specific
response to a concern for simplification of the rules in force in
the various Contracting States regarding jurisdiction of the
courts, as well as recognition and enforcement. That
simplification contributes, in the interest of everybody, to
promoting legal certainty. It is also intended to facilitate the
work of national courts in dealing with proceedings. It is
therefore preferable not to introduce into the system created by
the Convention elements which are liable seriously to
complicate its operation.”
Looking more specifically at the possible application of a
forum non conveniens doctrine to the Brussels-Lugano
regime, the Advocate-General concluded, with explicit
reference to the ECJ’s decision in Turner, that permitting its
introduction into the regime would run counter to the aim
of ensuring legal certainty and undermine its efficacy. He
said at paragraphs 263–70:
“(263) . . . by allowing the court seised the opportunity to
decline – in a purely discretionary manner – to exercise the
jurisdiction which it derives from a provision of the
Convention, such as Article 2, the doctrine of forum non
conveniens seriously affects the predictability of the effects of
the jurisdiction rules laid down by the Convention, in
particular the rule in Article 2. . . . that predictability . . .
constitutes the only way of ensuring observance of the
principle of legal certainty and ensuring greater legal
protection for people established in the Community, in
accordance with the objectives pursued by the Convention. Any
impact of that kind on the predictability of the jurisdiction
rules . . . thus ultimately detracts from the effectiveness of the
Convention.
(264) In that connection, it is important to bear in mind
that the Convention is largely inspired within the civil law
system, which attaches particular importance to the
predictability and inviolability of rules on jurisdiction. That
dimension has a lower profile in the common law system,
since the application of the rules in force is approached in a
somewhat more flexible manner and on a case-by-case basis.
In that way, the forum non conveniens doctrine fits easily
within the common law system, since it grants the court seised
the power to exercise a discretion in considering whether or
not it is appropriate to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it. It
is therefore clear that that doctrine is hardly compatible with
the spirit of the Convention.
(265) Quite apart from the foregoing general considerations,
it is important to consider in greater detail the procedural
consequences of implementing the forum non conveniens
doctrine. In my view, such consequences would be difficult to
reconcile with the objectives of the Convention which, let it be
remembered, relate both to observance of the principle of legal
certainty and to greater legal protection for people established
in the Community.
(266) As we have seen, as English law stands at present, the
application of that doctrine entails a stay of proceedings, that
is to say suspension of an action, which may operate sine die.
That situation is inherently unsatisfactory in terms of legal
certainty. 3
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(267) Moreover, in my view, instead of providing greater legal
protection for people established in the Community, the forum
non conveniens doctrine is more liable to undermine it. That
is particularly true for claimants.
(268) It bears repeating that it is upon a claimant seeking
to escape the effect of the procedural objection in question that
it is incumbent to establish his inability to secure a just
outcome in the foreign forum in question. Here too, that
situation is not satisfactory, in view of the real fear that that
procedural objection may be invoked by certain defendants for
the sole purpose of delaying the progress of proceedings
against them.
(269) Furthermore, where the court seised has finally decided
to allow the plea of forum non conveniens, it is once
again incumbent upon a claimant wishing to re-initiate
proceedings to produce the evidence necessary for that purpose.
Thus, it is for the claimant to establish that the foreign court
does not ultimately have jurisdiction to hear the case or that
he himself is not likely to secure a just outcome in that court
or has not been able to do so. That burden of proof on the
claimant may prove particularly heavy. In that respect,
application of the forum non conveniens doctrine is therefore
liable to have a considerable impact on the defence of his
interests, so that it tends to detract from rather than reinforce
the legal protection enjoyed by the claimant, contrary to the
objective of the Convention.
(270) Finally, in the event of the claimant not succeeding in
producing the evidence in question to oppose a stay of
proceedings (which could be pronounced sine die) or to
recommence proceedings already suspended, the only possibility
that would remain if he sought to pursue his claims would be
to take all the steps needed to commence a new suit before the
foreign court. It goes without saying that those steps have a
cost and are likely considerably to prolong the time spent in
the conduct of proceedings before the claimant finally has his
case heard. Moreover, in that respect, the mechanism
associated with the forum non conveniens doctrine could be
regarded as incompatible with the requirements of Article 6 of
the European Convention on the protection of human rights
and fundamental freedoms.”
The Advocate-General’s approach was, in a much pared
down form, adopted by the Court in its judgment in Owusu.
In doing so it emphasised, at paragraphs 38–43, that the
achievement of legal certainty was one of the regime’s aims
and that that would not be “fully guaranteed” if the doctrine
of forum non conveniens was held to be compatible with
the regime’s operation. It stressed once again that that
doctrine would undermine “the predictability of the rules of
jurisdiction laid down by the Brussels Convention . . . and
consequently to undermine the principle of legal certainty, which is
the basis of the Convention.”
It is more than apparent from the judgments and the
opinions of the Advocates General in the three cases that
the ECJ acknowledges the achievement of legal certainty as
a fundamental instrument of interpretation. The
commitment to certainty brooks no exceptions and guides
the regime’s interpretation and application. In so doing it
has led the ECJ to accept an interpretation of the
Convention which affords territorial range of very
considerable scope. Its international jurisdiction now
governs not only jurisdictional questions between the 29
member states but equally (one might say) their extra-
member state relations.
Mutual Trust
The second element which guided the ECJ in this line of
authorities is the doctrine of mutual trust. That is the idea
that each member state must place trust in the courts of
other member states properly to carry out their obligations
under the Convention. While there is nothing new about
this doctrine – indeed, as Blobel and Spath rightly note in
The Tale of Multilateral Trust and the European Law of Civil
Procedure (2005) European Law Review, 30 (4) at 528, it
can be traced back to the earliest days of the European
institutions – its importance as a guiding principle to the
interpretation and application of EC law had not previously
been stressed so clearly. Blobel and Spath again rightly note
that both Gasser and Turner “stand out (as judgments) for the
decisive weight . . .” the ECJ grants to the doctrine of mutual
trust: ibid at 531. It played no part in Owusu.
Its importance is indeed emphasised in robust terms.
Advocate-General Lèger relies on it in his opinion in Gasser,
in rejecting the argument that Article 21 could be
derogated from where the court first seised with a dispute
is in a member state, such as those identified at paragraph
85 of his opinion i.e., “Italy, Greece and France”, whose
courts are known for excessive delay. He makes the point
as follows:
“(88) . . . It does not really seem conceivable that it should
be possible to refrain from applying article 21 of the
Convention on the ground that the court first seised is
established in a member state in whose courts there are, in
general, excessive delays in dealing with cases. That would be
tantamount to saying that the rules on lis pendens do not
apply where the court first seised is established in one of
certain member states.
(89) Such an interpretation would be manifestly contrary to
the scheme and the basis of the Brussels Convention. The
Convention does not contain any provision to the effect that
its rules, in particular those of article 21, should cease to
apply because of the length of proceedings before the courts in
another contracting state. Moreover . . . the Convention is
based on the trust which the member states accord to each
other’s legal systems and judicial institutions: see R v
Medicines Control Agency, Ex p Smith & Nephew
Pharmaceuticals Ltd (Case C-201/94) [1996] ECR
I-581 . . . It is on the basis of that trust that the
Convention establishes a compulsory system of jurisdiction
which all the courts within its purview are required to observe.
It is also that trust which enables the contracting states to4
Amicus Curiae Issue 66 July/August 2006
waive the right to apply their internal rules on the recognition
and enforcement of foreign judgments in favour of a simplified
mechanism for recognition and enforcement. It is therefore
also the basis of the legal certainty which the Convention seeks
to ensure by allowing the parties to foresee with certainty
which court will have jurisdiction.”
The Advocate-General’s opinion was emphatically
endorsed by the ECJ, which at paragraph 72 of its
judgment attributes to mutual trust a key foundational role
in the development of the Brussels-Lugano regime:
“. . . it must be borne in mind that the Brussels Convention
is necessarily based on the trust which the contracting states
accord to each other’s legal systems and judicial institutions.
It is that mutual trust which has enabled a compulsory system
of jurisdiction to be established, which all the courts within
the purview of the Convention are required to respect, and as
a corollary the waiver by those states of the right to apply
their internal rules on recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments in favour of a simplified mechanism for the
recognition and enforcement of judgments.”
That foundational role, in tandem with the need to
ensure legal certainty and the absence of an explicit power
of derogation, left the Court in no doubt that the
procedural rule enunciated in Article 21 was not one
which could be derogated from where the court first seised
was one from a legal system characterised by delay.
Derogation on such a basis would tend to undermine the
requisite trust that all member states must repose in each
other’s legal systems.
A more detailed examination of the doctrine’s
importance is to be found in Turner at paragraphs 26–34.
First, the Advocate-General reviewed the argument put
forward by the UK government that anti-suit injunctions
were aimed at protecting an individual claimant from being
harassed by “obstructive procedural measures” arising from
abusive litigation by defendants in other jurisdictions and
thus protecting the integrity of UK proceedings and that
their use would thereby achieve the regime aim of reducing
the number of proceedings before the courts of various
member states. In his opinion that argument failed because
of the doctrine of mutual trust. He thought that anti-suit
injunctions ‘cast doubt’ on the doctrine. That they did so
was in his view “decisive.” It was impermissible to
undermine the doctrine of mutual trust. He noted that the
commitment to mutual trust had most recently been
emphasised in Recitals 16 and 17 of the Regulation. The
use of anti-suit injunctions, which either directly or
indirectly undermined mutual trust, was impermissible
because it would undermine European judicial co-
operation, “which presupposes that each state recognises the
capacity of other legal systems to contribute independently, but
harmoniously, to attainment of the stated objectives of integration”.
I pause here to note that mutual trust and judicial co-
operation are viewed as facilitative of a wider aim, namely
integration and a single internal market.
The Advocate-General’s rejection of the validity of anti-
suit injunctions was again endorsed by the European
Court. In its short judgment it highlighted the importance
afforded to the doctrine of mutual trust by emphasising the
rationale of the decision in Gasser and by concluding that:
“(25) It is inherent in that principle of mutual trust that,
within the scope of the Convention, the rules on jurisdiction
that it lays down, which are common to all the courts of the
contracting states, may be interpreted and applied with the
same authority by each of them: see, to that effect, Overseas
Union Insurance Ltd v New Hampshire Insurance Co
(Case C-351/89) [1992] QB 434, 458, para 23, and
Gasser, para 48.”
It is perhaps unsurprising that with such a ringing
endorsement of the doctrine the Court concluded that to
permit the court of one member state to find that
proceedings brought in another member state were
abusively brought was impermissible. Assessing the
appropriateness of proceeding in another member state
undermines mutual trust as it effectively undermines first,
the regime for such review put in place by the Convention,
and secondly, the ability of the courts of other member
states to assess for themselves the proceedings brought
before them. Impinging on the jurisdiction of another
court cannot but undermine trust between member states.
Development of the Single Internal Market
The third limb which has guided the ECJ’s
interpretation of the regime is the aim to facilitate the
growth of the single internal market. Of the three limbs it
is the least developed in this field.
It is only implicitly referred to in the Gasser judgment,
where the Court alludes to the Brussels-Lugano regime
itself being an embodiment of the single market ideal by
creating a common, uniform jurisdictional regime which
all courts of all member states have equal authority to
administer. The ECJ’s view is that to permit derogations
from its rules, such as that embodied in Article 21, would
run counter to that single juristic space: see paragraph 48.
A similar point is made in the Advocate-General’s opinion
in Turner at paragraph 37, where it is noted that while
member states are autonomous insofar as their national
civil procedural codes are concerned they must ensure that
any such rules comply with the underlying the regime. The
regime thus sets uniform, common standards with which
all member states must comply. It thus facilitates the
creation of a “true internal market” between the member
states.
The creation of common rules governing the
determination of issues of private international law by way
of the Brussels-Lugano regime is further identified in the
Advocate-General’s opinion in Owusu: see paragraphs
189–212. Rejecting the UK government’s argument that
the Brussels Conventions sought to facilitate the growth of
a common market only in respect of the recognition and 5
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enforcement of judgments delivered in member states, he
emphasised the content of the second and eighth recitals to
the Regulation’s preamble. As he put it at paragraph 196:
“(196) . . . as emphasised in the second and eighth recitals
in the preamble to the regulation, the jurisdictional rules
contained in it – in view of the diversity of the existing
national rules in this area and the resulting difficulties for the
proper functioning of the internal market – seek to ‘unify the
rules of conflict of jurisdiction in civil and commercial
matters’, so as to arrive at ‘common rules’ in the Member
States. This exercise of unifying jurisdictional rules forms part
of an approach comparable to that provided for in Article 94
EC for the adoption of directives, since the aim of that
substantive legal basis is ‘the approximation of such laws,
regulations or administrative provisions of the Member States
as directly affect the establishment or functioning of the
common market’.”
The Advocate-General drew further support for the
importance of the need to interpret the regime compatibly
with the aim of facilitating the growth of the single internal
market by reference to the interpretation of Article 95 of
the EC Treaty, Directive 95/46 and Regulation 1408/71. In
arriving at its judgment the Court at paragraph 34
expressly referred to this discussion when it emphasised
that the Brussels-Lugano regime was intended to facilitate
the development of the internal market so that: “. . . there
is a real and sufficient link with the working of the internal market,
by definition involving a number of member states.”
CONCLUSIONS
Where are we now? It seems to me that a number of
conclusions can be drawn from a contrast between the
approach of the English court and of the ECJ on the other
to two particular aspects of civil and commercial litigation.
The first is the anti-suit injunction and the second is forum
non conveniens. I take them in turn.
The anti-suit injunction
The contrast between the approaches can be seen from
a comparison between the English approach exemplified
by the judgment of Millett LJ in The Angelic Grace, which I
quoted earlier and the approach of the ECJ in Gasser and
Turner. The latter approach has been the subject of no little
academic criticism. That criticism includes articles by
Jonathan Mance (now of course Lord Mance) in LQR
2004, 120 (Jul), 357–65 and Adrian Briggs LQR 2004,
120 (Oct), 529–33.
Jonathan Mance recognises that the decision in Gasser is
imbued with pure European principle but observes that it
promises problems for legitimate claimants and
opportunities for those unwilling to meet their obligations.
Article 21 (now Art 27) adopts a simple test of
chronological priority for the court first seised. The effect
of Gasser is to give that court priority over the agreed
jurisdiction, so that, until the court first seised has decided
that there is indeed a binding jurisdiction clause in favour
of the courts of another member state, the latter must
decline jurisdiction in favour of the former and the former
must accept jurisdiction. He says:
“It is at the practical efficacy of Art.17 (now Art.23) that
the European Court’s decision in Erich Gasser seriously
strikes. London is one important elective jurisdiction. However,
the decision is of far from parochial concern, and may even
affect commercial parties’ willingness to agree to litigate (as
distinct from arbitrate) in Europe.”
Jonathan Mance then contrasts the views of Advocate
General Leger with those of the ECJ as follows:
“The Advocate General was M Philippe Léger. In a
comprehensive and nuanced Opinion he drew the analogy
between exclusive jurisdiction under Art 16 (now Art 22) and
Art 17 (now Art 23). In paras [57], [62] and [66]–[68],
he pointed out that, if Art 21 prevailed, it would “seriously
compromise” the utility of Art 17 and the legal certainty to
which it contributed. He went on:
“67… In effect, … the party who, in violation of his
obligations resulting from the agreed choice of
jurisdiction, has first initiated proceedings before a
tribunal which he knows to be incompetent could
abusively delay the resolution of the dispute on the merits
when he knows this would be unfavourable to him …
68. This consequence is shocking as a matter of principle
and risks encouraging delaying tactics…”
The Advocate General also noted that the basic problem was
one of tactical manoeuvring, not simply delay in some judicial
systems. A party commencing proceedings in a country (State
A) other than the country agreed (State B) would “use every
internal means to delay the moment when the decision that
this jurisdiction is incompetent becomes definitive” (para
[69]). The solution was to allow the court second seised to
continue to exercise jurisdiction provided that it could
establish the existence and application of the agreed choice of
jurisdiction clause in a rigorous manner and beyond any
possible doubt – any risk of contradictory decisions being
thereby largely avoided) paras [81–83].
The European Court reached very different conclusions: see
[2004] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 222. As to question two, the court
second seised must under Art 21 always defer to a court first
seised, unless and until that court declares itself incompetent.
There should be a clear and precise rule, in view of “the
disputes which could arise as to the very existence of a genuine
agreement between the parties” within Art17. A court second
seised is “in no case … in a better position than the court
first seised to *360 determine whether the latter has
jurisdiction” (para. [48]). Practical implications were
summarily dismissed:
“53…the difficulties … stemming from delaying tactics
… are not such as to call in question the interpretation6
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of any provision of the Brussels Convention as deducted
from its wording and purpose”.
The court answered question three even more shortly, though
with the Advocate General’s support. An exception to Art 21
based on excessive delay was contrary to the letter, spirit and
aim of the Convention (para [70]). The Convention was
necessarily based on mutual trust, and sought to ensure legal
certainty (para. [72]. The court impliedly rejected the United
Kingdom’s fall-back suggestion that the court of State B
could determine jurisdiction under and exclusive clause where
(i) suit was issued in state A in bad faith to block any suit in
State B and (ii) the court in State A had failed to adjudicate
upon its own jurisdiction within a reasonable time.
It may comfort theoreticians that the Community has rules of
ideological purity and logical certainty. But the result can
only be practical uncertainty with large scope for tactical
manoeuvring. The irrebutable assumption that all national
systems operate for the best shows the barrier on the Rhine
between Strasbourg and Luxembourg concerns and thinking.”
Jonathan Mance expresses the view that the reasoning of
the ECJ is in five critical respects unpersuasive: see pages
360–2. I will refer briefly to only three. His first point is
that the ECJ’s judgment seems ambivalent whether article
21 is subject to any exceptions. What about article 16? He
asks the question:
“If Art. 16 is an exception, why should Art. 17, resting on
party autonomy, be different? …. According to the Schlosser
Report (para 22), not mentioned by the court, a court must
‘also of its own motion consider whether there exists an
agreement on jurisdiction which excludes the court’s
jurisdiction and which is valid in accordance with article 1.’”
His third point is that, whereas in some circumstances
the court first seised may be better placed to rule on the
question of jurisdiction, the reverse applies where the
parties have chosen a jurisdiction. His fourth point (which
is closely related to his third) is this:
“Fourthly, the ‘legal certainty’ so esteemed by the court
consists apparently in knowing ‘clearly and precisely which of
the two national courts is to establish whether it has
jurisdiction under the rules of the Convention’ (paras 51 and
72). But the parties’ commitment, when contracting., was
that the chosen court should assume its exclusive jurisdiction
without delay and without either party having to engage in
litigation elsewhere to achieve this.”
In conclusion Jonathan Mance suggests that in contrast
to the ECJ’s absolutist approach, the Advocate General’s
careful opinion offered a measured compromise. I must
say that I agree with that.
In his article Adrian Briggs focused on Turner, in which
the court simply held that an anti-suit injunction was
incompatible with the Convention, even in a case in which
the injunction was granted by the court first seised. He said
that “taken together with the court’s wilful weakening of
jurisdiction agreements (noted by … Jonathan Mance …),
an effective and sophisticated tool of English commercial
litigation has been decommissioned.” Adrian Briggs
expressed his views in strong terms. He referred to the
Continental Bank case and observed that the effect of Gasser
and Turner is that it cannot be reconciled with the
Convention. He added:
“It is well known that many continental lawyers have a
peculiar hostility to the anti-suit injunction. As an antidote
to jurisdictional shenanigans its usefulness is second to none,
but its roots did not lie in civilian legal systems. So it had to
go, as the dullardism of the lowest common denominator
asserted itself. In its place, we are to repose trust in the other
states’ legal systems and judicial institutions. This pious
substitute for adjudication may be all very well for judges and
diplomats, but it was not much use to Gasser or Turner, and
will doubtless be just as useless for future litigants who
inhabit the real world. No doubt the enlargement of the
European Union will bring even more opportunities to trust
foreign legal systems, and make even more redundant the
summary and direct enforcement of jurisdictional agreements
and jurisdictional rules.”
I would not myself use such strong language but it does
seem to me to be a pity that the ECJ has set itself against
the anti-suit injunction with quite such determination.
Why not adopt the sensible compromise suggested by
Advocate General Leger quoted above (and not expressly
commented upon by the ECJ), namely that the solution is
to allow the court second seised to continue to exercise
jurisdiction provided that it could establish the existence
and application of the agreed choice of jurisdiction clause
in a rigorous manner and beyond any possible doubt—any
risk of contradictory decisions being thereby largely
avoided?
I hope that one of these days the ECJ might be willing to
consider some of these considerations. After all there is
now a good deal of academic comment to the effect that its
present approach can be said to legitimise the use of a
procedural device whose purpose is to frustrate the proper
determination of disputes. This is the device which has
become known as “the Italian Torpedo”: see Delaygua,
Choice of Court Clauses: Two Recent Developments [2004]
ICCLR 15 (9) 288 at 295. It is an approach which can be
compared with the French courts’ approval of their own
use of anti-suit injunctions: see Banque Worms v Brachot
(cass. 1re civ., November 11, 2002; 2003 Rev. Crit. 816).1
The French introduction of the anti-suit injunction might
be thought to support the conclusion that this type of
injunction is not antipathetic to civilian jurisdictions. It
might also help to persuade the ECJ to give serious
consideration to its approval as part of the armoury of all
member states’ courts as a necessary procedural device in
7
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1 Cited in Briggs LQR (2004) 120, Oct at 530.
order to ensure that the Brussels-Lugano regime is not
abused.
However, until the ECJ is persuaded to change its view
that anti-suit injunctions are impermissible, it must be
recognised that the law applicable in England (as in other
member states) is as stated in Gasser and Turner. Thus the
Continental Bank case can no longer be regarded as good law.
The question remains whether the English court is now
prevented from granting anti-suit injunctions in cases to
which the Convention (or Regulation) does not apply. This
is a point which I have had to consider in a judicial capacity
in the comparatively recent past. This was in a case which
we held was outside the Convention because it was within
the arbitration exception in Article 1.2 (d) of the
Regulation. The case was Through Transport Mutual Insurance
Association (Eurasia) Ltd v New India Assurance Co. Ltd [2005]
1 Lloyd’s Rep 67 in the Court of Appeal.
The basis of the jurisdictional dispute before the court
was relatively straightforward. Certain goods were to be
transported by ship from Calcutta to Kotka in Finland.
They were then to be transported to Moscow. They were
however lost during the final leg of their journey. They
were insured against loss and damage by the defendants,
New India Assurance. The shipper claimed against that
policy. That claim was subsequently compromised and the
benefit of any action against the carrier was assigned to
New India. The carrier and an associated company that
was also involved in the shipment however declared
bankruptcy. They were insured by the claimants, Through
Transport. New India issued proceedings in Finland under
a Finish third parties’ rights against insurers statute against
Through Transport. After the proceedings were served,
Through Transport sought to contest jurisdiction and did
so by way of issuing proceedings in England for a
declaration that the parties were bound by an arbitration
clause, which required the parties to arbitrate the dispute
in England, and an anti-suit injunction. An issue arose
between the parties as to whether the arbitration clause
applied. The English High Court held that the Regulation
did not apply as it did not apply to arbitration proceedings
and it thus granted the sought for declaration and anti-suit
injunction. New India appealed.
One of the issues the Court of Appeal had to decide was
whether it was bound to apply the Gasser decision and hold
that, as the court second seised, it must stay the
proceedings before it pending the outcome of a
jurisdictional challenge in Finland. It seemed to the Court
that, at least as a matter of principle, there was an
argument that the Regulation required the court first seised
to determine the issue of jurisdiction i.e., whether the
proceedings before it fell under the arbitration exception
(see paragraph 24). It appeared to us however that such an
approach was inconsistent with the ECJ’s decision in Marc
Rich & Co AG v Societa Italiana PA (The Atlantic Emperor)
[1992] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 342.
A strong argument was put to us that The Atlantic Emperor
could not now be relied on to support the conclusion that
the English court had the requisite jurisdiction. That
argument was based on an application of Gasser to the effect
that as the court first seised the Finnish court was the
correct court to determine the issue of jurisdiction. We
took the view that Gasser could be distinguished as in that
case both parties accepted that both sets of proceedings in
Italy and Austria fell within the regime. In contrast the
question before the court here was whether the English
proceedings fell within the regime at all. It was not
therefore a question of how did the regime apply but
whether it applied at all (paragraph 36). Given that
distinction and the decision in The Atlantic Emperor we
concluded that the correct approach would be for the
English court, even as the court second seised, to
determine whether the proceedings fell within the regime
and then only if they did apply the regime’s procedural
rules.
Agreeing with the judge, we held on the facts that the
proceedings were within the arbitration exception and thus
outside the Brussels-Lugano regime. On that basis the
question arose whether we should grant an injunction
restraining the claimant from proceeding in Finland. That
raised the question whether it would be wrong in principle
to do so in the light of the decision in Gasser and Turner.
Should the principle in those cases that no anti-suit
injunction be granted in the interests of certainty and
mutual trust equally be applied where proceedings are said
to have been brought in one member state in breach of an
arbitration clause?
We reached the conclusion that the answer to that
question was no. The case was not like Gasser because there
was no breach of an exclusive jurisdiction clause and the
proceedings were outside the Convention because they
were within the arbitration exception and it was not like
Turner because it was not a case in which the sole question
was whether the proceedings restrained were vexatious or
oppressive and there was no breach of an arbitration
agreement. We reached the conclusion, rightly or wrongly
that, where proceedings are brought in breach of an
arbitration clause the principles expressed by Millett LJ in
The Angelic Grace remain applicable. I recognise that there is
scope for argument as to whether that is correct or not. It
appears that Adrian Briggs thinks that it is not. However,
the view we took was that, once it is held that the
proceedings are in breach of an arbitration agreement,
there is nothing in the Convention to prevent the court
from granting an injunction on the basis of Millett LJ’s
principles. It seemed to us that no question of mutual trust
arose, there was no reason why the Finnish court should be
offended by an injunction which would simply have
enjoined the New India personally. We noted that, if the
positions had been reversed, there would have been no
question of the English courts being offended by an
injunction granted elsewhere enjoining claimants from8
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continuing with proceedings in England in breach of an
agreement to arbitrate. This approach was followed by
Colman J in The Front Comor [2005] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 257.
In the event, however, we allowed the appeal against the
grant of an anti-suit injunction in that case because we
formed the view that in the particular circumstances of the
case the proceedings in Finland were not brought in breach
of contract and that, applying Turner, it would not be
appropriate to grant an injunction. Let it never be said that
the English courts do not loyally apply the decisions of the
ECJ to questions to which they are applicable. I should
however add that in The Front Comor Colman J, following
The Jay Bola [1997] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 279 (a case not cited to
us in Through Transport), granted an injunction in a case
where the proceedings restrained were brought by
subrogated underwriters. Neither side sought to appeal to
the House of Lords in Through Transport but I understand
that there is to be a leap frog appeal to the House of Lords
in The Front Coma. Moreover I understand that the appeal is
to be heard in the near future. I shall look forward with
great interest to the result, especially to the speech of Lord
Mance.
Forum non Conveniens
Owusu had also come in for some academic criticism,
notably by Adrain Briggs in LQR 2005 121 (OCT) 535-
540. He says that this was the third time in 15 months that
the ECJ has struck a blow against international commercial
litigation. As to Owusu he says:
“And now the court has ruled that though an English court
has been satisfied, clearly and distinctly, that a court in a
non-contracting state is more appropriate for the trial of the
action, and has further determined that no injustice would be
done to the claimant if the English proceedings were stayed, a
defendant domiciled in the United Kingdom may not seek,
and a court may not grant, a stay on the ground of forum
non conveniens.”
Adrian Briggs notes that the effect of Owusu is to
overrule Re Harrods (Buenos Aires) Ltd, to which I referred
earlier, and says that the real, if collateral, victims of the
ruling were the five Jamaican defendants, who had no
connection with any member state but found that they
were in effect dragged to England to defend themselves.
Briggs describes the ECJ as being ‘airily dismissive of their
predicament’. As he puts it, the ECJ simply stated that such
considerations were not such as to call into question the
fundamental rule of jurisdiction contained in Article 2.
I must say that this does seem a startling result and
appears to promote the principle of legal certainty above
the more pragmatic and (it might be thought) just solution
of arriving at a fair conclusion on the facts of a particular
case. However, it is not perhaps for me to say. I leave you
to judge.
POSTSCRIPT
I am sure that these three decisions have not provided a
fatal blow to commercial litigation, whether in England or
elsewhere but they have certainly not helped. I hope that
the ECJ will bear some of these considerations in mind
when deciding future questions of this kind.
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The Rt Hon Sir Anthony Clarke
Master of the Rolls
